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Gender as an Impediment to Labor
Market Success: Why Do Young
Women Report Greater Harm?
Heather Antecol, Illinois State University
Peter Kuhn, University of California, Santa Barbara
Compared to older women, young female job seekers are more than
three times as likely to report that their ability to find a good new job
is compromised by their gender. This phenomenon cannot be statistically attributed to observed personal or job characteristics, or to
any “objective” measure of discrimination. Further, women’s reports
of gender-induced advantage, and men’s reports of gender-induced
harm, are also more prevalent among the young. A possible interpretation of all these patterns is that young people are more likely to
interpret a given departure from gender-neutral treatment as causally
affected by their gender.
I. Introduction
In a number of recent articles (e.g., Kuhn 1987, 1990; Barbezat and
Hughes 1990; Heywood 1992; Hampton and Heywood 1993, 1996;
Laband and Lentz 1993, 1998; Johnson and Neumark 1997), labor economists have begun to analyze aspects of labor market discrimination that,
unlike more standard “residual wage gap” measures (Oaxaca 1973), are
directly derived from survey reports of discriminatory treatment. Survey
The authors would like to thank Human Resources Development Canada for
making the data for this study available and the Canadian International Labour
Network (CILN) for financial support. CILN receives major funding from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and McMaster
University. Felice Martinello and David Robinson provided helpful comments.
[ Journal of Labor Economics, 2000, vol. 18, no. 4]
© 2000 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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reports of discrimination can be of interest to economists for a number of
reasons, including as a check on the validity of traditional “wage gap”
measures, and as objects of interest in their own right. For a number of
issues, including public support for antidiscrimination policies, and the
prevalence of the kind of discriminatory treatment that may be remediable in courts of law, survey reports of discrimination may in fact be more
relevant than wage gap measures.1
A common, but often overlooked, finding in the literature on survey
reports of discrimination is a greater tendency for younger women to feel
harmed by discrimination than older women (see, e.g., Kuhn 1987; and
Laband and Lentz 1998). What explains this? Because measured genderwage gaps tend to be lower among young women than among older
women, earlier work has tended to attribute higher reports of discrimination among young women to a larger amount of unmeasured discriminatory treatment.2 In this article, we shed new light on this and other
hypotheses about reported discrimination using a new survey of Canadian job seekers. This survey contains more extensive information on
perceived discrimination than has been available in earlier surveys; in
particular, it contains questions on gender-induced advantage as well as
harm and asks the reported gender discrimination questions of both men
and women.3
We begin our analysis by replicating earlier results: in our data, female
job seekers aged 15–24 are more than three times as likely to say they have
been hurt by their gender in the labor market than those aged 55– 64. We
then assess various possible explanations of this phenomenon in turn. We
show, first, that higher reports of harm among young women cannot be
explained by any measured personal or job characteristics. Second, these
reports cannot be explained by any standard measures of “objective”
discrimination that have been used by economists: in our sample, measured discrimination on a very wide array of outcome measures is always
lower among young women.
Third, using the extra information in the current survey on women’s
perceptions of gender-induced advantage, and on men’s perceptions of
1
While econometric evidence of wage gaps is becoming increasingly accepted
in many courts, evidence of specific incidents of discriminatory treatment—which
may or may not be reflected in wage measures—is still seen as stronger support
for a claim of discrimination in almost all cases.
2
For example, Kuhn (1987, p. 581) concludes that “young, well-educated
women behave as if they experience considerably more nonstatistical evidence of
discrimination than others.”
3
The nature of our survey allows us as well to examine the effects on reports
of a much wider array of statistical measures of discrimination: in addition to
wage gaps, we are able to consider gaps in unemployment, wage changes between
jobs, and reservation wages.
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gender-induced harm, we are able to rule out a higher mean level of
unmeasured discrimination against young women as an explanation of
their more frequent reports of harm. The reason for this is a robust and
surprising “symmetry” that we find in the age patterns of reported harm
and advantage: for both women and men, the frequency of both reported
harm and advantage declines with age. Clearly, these patterns cannot be
explained by a higher overall level of discrimination against young
women, even of a form that is not captured by standard discrimination
measures.
Finally, we estimate a formal model of the decision to report genderinduced advantage or harm that allows us to test two further explanations
of the above patterns. One of these— greater dispersion in the labor
market experiences of young workers—receives mixed support: essentially, if our result is driven by age-related differences in dispersion, these
differences must be of a form that is not captured by any of the measured
characteristics in our sample, including education, marital status, presence
of young children, job tenure, and percent female in one’s occupation.
The other explanation involves a particular kind of age difference in
reporting behavior. According to this interpretation, young workers of
both sexes are simply more willing to label departures in either direction
from gender-neutral treatment as being caused by their gender. In this
sense, young workers are less “tolerant” of both traditional and reverse
discrimination, a phenomenon that might pose a challenge for the design
of future antidiscrimination policy.
Section II describes the data used in this study. Section III presents our
main results concerning women’s reports of gender-induced harm. Section IV broadens the analysis to include women’s reports of genderinduced advantage, and men’s reports of harm, and estimates our formal
model of reporting. Section V concludes.
II. Data
The data used in our analysis are drawn from a nationally representative sample of Canadians who have recently experienced a job separation:
the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP). Individuals separating from jobs in 2 window periods during 1995 were identified using
administrative records of the Unemployment Insurance system, which
requires employers to file a Record of Employment (ROE) form whenever a separation occurs. The data contain a rich set of measures about a
worker’s preseparation job, his or her first postseparation job, the (postseparation) job at the time of the interview, and on unemployment spells;
our analysis focuses on the actual and perceived outcomes of these
workers’ search for a new job. Unlike some other studies of discrimination, the current study thus focuses particularly on actual and perceived
discrimination in access to jobs, rather than, for example, discrimination
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within jobs. This is useful, in our view, because it is widely accepted that
the former issue of access to jobs, rather than the latter, plays the central
role in explaining male-female wage gaps today (see, e.g., Johnson and
Solon 1986).4
Because of a problem with how reports of gender-induced harm were
measured, in this article we only use the information from separations in
the first window of the 1995 COEP survey, which consists of 3,898
individuals.5 Eliminating individuals who were 65 years of age or over left
us with a sample of 1,586 women and 2,280 men. Descriptive statistics on
the main variables used in our analysis are presented in table 1. Inspection
of table 1 reveals that, on average, women in our sample are slightly older
than men but have about 10 weeks less tenure on their preseparation jobs.
Further, women are more likely to have education at the higher levels
(college and university) compared to the men in our sample. Not surprisingly, women are much more likely to be in highly feminized occupations, though they do not differ markedly from men in their marital
status distribution and presence of children. Turning to labor market
“outcome” variables, table 1 shows that the mean hourly preseparation
wages of men and women are $15.72 and $10.09, respectively. Thus,
women earn 64% of what men do before the separation. A slightly
smaller earnings ratio (61%) is found for postseparation wages. In our
sample of unemployment durations, women had been unemployed about
3 weeks longer than men as of the survey date, which was usually about
38 weeks after the separation.6
Finally, the measure of gender-induced harm in the current article is
based on the following question: “In any of the job search that you have
done since [the separation date], do you feel that your gender has had an
impact on your ability to find a good job?” To avoid framing the question
in a way that might encourage responses in either direction, the allowed

4
The focus on job seekers also serves to eliminate a potential explanation of the
age difference in reports suggested in Kuhn (1987): the notion that young women
might have had less of a chance to locate a nondiscriminatory employer than older
women. In the current data, women of all ages are engaged in the search for a new
job, yet we continue to see the patterns found in nationally representative surveys
of reported discrimination.
5
In cohort 2 the question on perceived harm was only asked of people who, at
the survey date, were still searching for a job. To the extent that these individuals
are still searching because they have had disappointing search outcomes, or
because they can afford to search longer than others, they will be systematically
different from the population of all job separations.
6
In some of what follows we analyze the unemployment durations of the
individuals in our sample. When we do so our sample is further restricted to
individuals who lost their job due to a layoff, and who reported that they engaged
in at least some search for a new job after the layoff. See n. 14 below.
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Table 1
Sample Mean Characteristics
Men

Age
Education variables:
Less than high school
High school
Some college or university
College
University
Marital status:
Married
Separated/divorced/widowed
Single
Children less than 6 years old
Percent female in occupation
Tenure (weeks)
Preseparation hourly wage
Postseparation hourly wage
Unemployment spell (weeks)
Discrimination measures:
Hurt
Help
Number of observations

Women

Mean

(SE)

Mean

(SE)

36.65

(.23)

37.41

(.27)

.34
.31
.14
.12
.10

(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)

.25
.32
.13
.16
.14

(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)

.61
.08
.31
.28
.25
230.53
15.72
16.37
20.70

(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.00)
(7.79)
(.16)
(.19)
(.44)

.62
.12
.26
.23
.55
219.79
10.09
10.06
23.84

(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(7.19)
(.13)
(.16)
(.68)

.06
.05
2,280

(.00)
(.00)

.10
.04
1,586

(.01)
(.00)

NOTE.—Unemployment spells include incomplete spells. Due to missing data, the number of observations is lower for some variables.

responses were (1) yes, hurt; (2) yes, helped; or (3) no impact. In cohort
one, which forms the basis of our sample, the question was asked of all
individuals, irrespective of gender, and irrespective of their employment
status at the time of the interview. For brevity in what follows, we
occasionally refer to this as the “reported discrimination” question; to
individuals choosing the “yes, hurt” response as experiencing “hurtful
discrimination”; and to those indicating “yes, helped” as experiencing
“helpful discrimination,” that is, being a beneficiary of labor market
discrimination.7
According to table 1, about 14% of women and 11% of men experiencing a job separation report that their gender had some effect on their
ability to find a good new job, with the balance—a vast majority of both
men and women—indicating they felt their gender had no effect. Among
those who reported advantage or harm, women were more likely to feel
that they were hurt than helped, by a ratio of about 10 to 4, while men’s
7
It may be objected that this question does not include the word discrimination. Although this is true, the age patterns of reported “discrimination” in our
study are similar to a number of other studies (e.g., Laband and Lentz 1998),
increasing our confidence that they capture the same phenomenon.
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reports were almost evenly split between those who were hurt or helped.
Thus, while hurtful discrimination against women is the most common
way in which gender is perceived to affect search outcomes, other forms
of perceived gender-induced harm or advantage also play substantial roles
in our sample.
III. Women’s Reports of Gender-Induced Harm
Table 2 shows the fraction of women reporting gender-induced harm in
five age categories. As in Kuhn (1987), it is clear that women’s reports of
hurtful discrimination are highest among the young: in the present case
they are more than three times as frequent among women under 25, at
13.2% of the sample, than among women aged 55– 64, at 4.3%. This
difference is the main stylized “fact” we analyze in this article and echoes
earlier findings in Kuhn (1987) and others.
Can young women’s more frequent reports of gender-induced harm be
explained by differences in observed characteristics between them and
older women? To answer this question, we first estimate a probit model
of hurtful discrimination on age only. We then add observed covariates to
see if, under any specification, the direct effect of age is substantially
reduced in magnitude. Before discussing our results, it is worth commenting on the role of one particular variable included in these regressions: the
gender composition of one’s occupation.8 We included this variable to
capture what we initially considered a very appealing explanation for the
pattern observed in our data: perhaps young women are more likely to be
“pioneers,” that is, be among the first women to enter high-paying,
formerly all-male occupations such as law, science, medicine, and management. High levels of reported discrimination could occur because
these workplaces had not yet adapted themselves to women’s presence
and because of lingering sexist attitudes; this could be consistent, as noted
below, with low levels of measured discrimination because these are
high-paying occupations for women.9
8
Percent female was calculated for the 19 occupations coded in the COEP
survey from a nationally representative sample of workers in the 1994 Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF). Like all the right-hand-side variables used here, this
refers to the preseparation job to avoid endogeneity. The correct interpretation is,
we believe, that women with previous jobs in highly feminized occupations are
likely to have skills that are specific to such occupations. Their search activity is
therefore more likely to focus on those kinds of jobs.
9
A formal version of the “pioneers” hypothesis can be found in Kuhn (1993).
In that model, binding entry restrictions against women seeking access to jobs
“designed” for men become more likely as women’s labor force attachment
becomes more similar to men’s, and as the gender wage gap consequently narrows. (The intuition is that women will not want those jobs until they become
sufficiently committed to the work force.) Thus, to the extent that wanting a
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Table 2
Women’s Reports of Gender-Induced
Harm, by Age Group
Age
55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
15–24

Gender-Induced Harm
(Fraction Reporting)
.043
.088
.093
.123
.132

(.005)
(.007)
(.007)
(.008)
(.008)

NOTE.—Exact binomial standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3 presents estimates of various specifications of a probit for
reported gender-induced harm. The following results are of note. Although the age coefficient does tend to decline in significance as controls
are added, it remains negative and of roughly the same magnitude no
matter what the specification. In particular, the difference in the predicted
probability of reporting gender-induced harm between women aged 20
and women aged 50, holding all other characteristics fixed at their mean
level, ranges from 0.144 to 0.097. The only other variables that affect
reports of hurtful discrimination are the percent female in one’s occupation and, perhaps, marital status. Percent female does have the effect
anticipated on reports: women who are a minority in their occupations
(low values of percent female) are much more likely to report encountering hurtful discrimination in their search for a new job, perhaps simply
because they are more likely to be interacting with, and competing with,
men in the job-search process. Importantly, however, this does not help
explain the age pattern in reports in our data: adding the percent female
variable has essentially no effect on the estimated age effect on reported
harm. The reason is that, in our data, age and percent female are hardly
related: while “pioneers” do run into more barriers, apparently women of
all age groups have their share of pioneers.
We conclude from table 3 that, while some of the observable characteristics of women in our sample have interesting and potentially important effects on women’s reports of gender-induced harm, none of these
other characteristics is able to account for the observed effect of age on
reported harm. Therefore, we examine an alternative explanation for

traditionally “male” job but being denied entry to it is a kind of discrimination,
this kind of discrimination will (a) not be captured by standard wage-gap measures and (b) be most common among those groups of women (e.g., younger
cohorts) who are most committed to the labor market and face the smallest
measured wage gaps.
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Table 3
Probit Coefficients for Gender-Induced Harm, Various Specifications

Age

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

⫺.0134
(3.20)

⫺.0138
(3.15)
⫺.0142
(.12)
⫺.1490
(.95)
⫺.1387
(.93)
.1932
(1.38)

⫺.0115
(2.05)
.0098
(.08)
⫺.1758
(1.09)
⫺.1442
(.95)
.1953
(1.36)
⫺.2465
(2.17)

⫺.0112
(1.99)
⫺.0171
(.14)
⫺.1807
(1.10)
⫺.1251
(.81)
.1747
(1.19)
⫺.2186
(1.89)

⫺.0106
(1.85)
.0151
(.12)
⫺.1173
(.71)
⫺.0445
(.28)
.2472
(1.64)
⫺.2270
(1.96)

.1366
(.85)

.1494
(.92)

.1224
(.75)

⫺.0396
(.45)
⫺.0001
(.37)

⫺.0472
(.52)
.0000
(.20)

⫺.0409
(.45)
.0000
(.05)

yes
1,471

⫺.5660
(2.72)
yes
1,466

High school
Some college/university
College degree
University degree
Married
Separated, divorced,
widowed
Children less than 6
years old
Tenure
Percent female in
occupation
Province dummies
Number of observations

no
1,548

no
1,519

no
1,473

NOTE.—Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.

young women’s more frequent reports of hurtful discrimination: higher
levels of measured labor market discrimination against them. To examine
this hypothesis, we first compute individual-specific measures of discrimination for three labor market outcomes—postseparation wages, preseparation wages, and unemployment durations, as follows.10 We compute
three alternative measures because, especially in this sample of job searchers, there may be a number of plausible ways in which women are affected
by discrimination, and we want to be sure that no plausible channel by
10
Most plausibly, we would probably expect reported discrimination during
the job search interval to be related to the quality of the job that was ultimately
found (i.e., the postseparation wage) and the length of time required to find it
(unemployment duration). However it is also possible that the frequency of
discriminatory treatment encountered by a population subgroup (e.g., young
women) can have equilibrium effects on the wages or unemployment durations of
all members of the group (e.g., via a lower reservation wage in the search for the
preseparation as well as the postseparation job). If it does, then the preseparation
wage—which has the advantage of being observed for substantially more individuals in our data—should also give an indication of the distribution of discrimination across broad population subgroups.
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which measured discrimination patterns might explain the age pattern in
reports is overlooked.11
For the case of wage discrimination, we compute our measure of
“objective” discrimination by first estimating the following log wage
regressions:

冘X ␤ ⫹
J

w Fi ⫽

F
ij

F
j

F
i

(1)

j⫽0

and

冘X ␤
J

wM
i ⫽

M
ij

M
j

⫹ M
i ,

(2)

j⫽0

where F stands for female, M stands for male, w Fi and w M
i are individual
log wages, and X ij is a vector of ones for j ⫽ 0. We then use the estimated
coefficients from equations (1) and (2) to compute two alternative individual-specific measures of discrimination against women, as follows:12

冘 X ␤ˆ
J

D̂ 1i ⫽

F
ij

M
j

⫺ w Fi

(3)

j⫽0

and

冘
J

D̂ 2i ⫽

j⫽0

冘 X ␤ˆ .
J

X Fij␤ˆ M
j ⫺

F
ij

F
j

(4)

j⫽0

Conceptually, both the above definitions of discrimination can be
thought of as the (log) difference between what a specific woman actually
11
In our analysis we also looked at two other outcomes: wage differences
between the preseparation and postseparation jobs and reported reservation
wages. Consistent with our prior expectation that the amount of discrimination is
a relatively permanent characteristic of the market for workers of a given age,
wage differences were unrelated to age, while reservation wages followed the same
pattern as preseparation and postseparation wage levels. Thus neither of these are
able to explain the age pattern in reports either.
12
More commonly, discrimination measures have been computed as a predicted log wage difference for an “average” woman in the sample (Oaxaca 1973).
The measures used here simply apply Oaxaca’s decomposition to each individual
woman in the sample (see Kuhn 1987).
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earns and what she would earn “if she were a man.” The difference
between the two concerns the definition of the counterfactual: D̂ 2i implicitly compares a woman to a man with both her observed characteristics and unobserved ability (thus the earnings function residual drops
out of the expression); D̂1i compares a woman’s actual earnings to a man
with her observed characteristics of “average” unobserved ability.13 Because, even controlling for measurable characteristics, men tend to earn
more than women, we expect the majority of individual D̂ i ’s, according
to either measure, in our sample to be positive.
Our measure of discrimination in unemployment durations is computed as similarly to the wage measures as possible, given the nature of
our data. We first estimate male and female log duration regressions in a
manner strictly parallel to (1) and (2), using a censored-normal model to
account for incomplete spells. Unlike the wage regressions, however, this
regression was restricted to individuals who lost their job due to a layoff
and who engaged in at least some job search after the separation.14
Because longer durations are worse labor market outcomes than shorter
ones, our estimates of discrimination are then the negatives of (3) and (4).
The measure, D̂ 1i , that relies on actual individual durations is treated as
missing for individuals whose durations are censored.
In table 4, we present unadjusted means of the three different labor
market outcomes, and of individual-specific discrimination measures
based on each outcome, for women in different age categories. In all the
regressions underlying table 4, the following variables are included in the
X ij ’s: age, education, region, marital status, number of children less than
6 years of age, and tenure on the preseparation job.15 Two immediately
apparent features of table 4 are the similarity of the patterns in unadjusted
13
A priori, it is not clear which of these two comparisons we would expect
most women to make. To the extent that individuals observe more about each
other than the econometrician, the former comparison (a man with similar
observed and unobserved ability) would seem more appropriate. On the other
hand, individuals might discount components of either good or bad “luck” in
their own earnings residuals when making these comparisons, which tends to
favor the latter measure, i.e., D̂ 1i .
14
We determined who was actively involved in search based on two questions
in the COEP survey: “Did you look for work between the separation date and the
first job [you held since the separation]?” (only asked of people who had a first
job) and “Did you look for work between the separation date and [the survey
date]?” (only asked of people who had no jobs since the separation). If the answer
was no to either of these questions, the respondents were dropped from the
sample.
15
Percent female is not included in the calculation of measured discrimination
because we adopt the view that women’s concentration in highly feminized
occupations is an outcome of discrimination. That said, the results do not differ
markedly when it is included.

.569
.575
.504
.372
.259

Age

55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
15–24

.738
.564
.438
.340
.450

Adjusted
Gap (D̂ 1 )
(2)
.602
.556
.494
.377
.322

Adjusted
Gap (D̂ 2 )
(3)
.660
.609
.546
.423
.373

Unadjusted
Gap
(4)
.831
.633
.493
.403
.504

Adjusted
Gap (D̂ 1 )
(5)

Postseparation Wages

.678
.615
.553
.435
.405

Adjusted
Gap (D̂ 2 )
(6)
.358
.392
.468
.172
.071

Unadjusted
Gap
(7)
.976
.551
.608
.476
.791

Adjusted
Gap (D̂ 1 )
(8)
.377
.292
.317
.280
.031

Adjusted
Gap (D̂ 2 )
(9)

Unemployment Durations*

* Female unemployment duration minus male. Censoring adjusted for using a censored normal regression model of log spell duration, separately by age category.

Unadjusted
Gap
(1)

Preseparation Wages

Measured Discrimination: Various Outcome Measures

Table 4
Selected Measures of “Objective” Discrimination, by Age Group
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versus regression-adjusted wage gaps, and the similarity of patterns for
preseparation and postseparation wages. In one sense, neither of these
should be surprising: measured discrimination is a relatively permanent
characteristic of the labor market for workers of a given age and education
level, and (because men’s and women’s characteristics differ little) it is
largely driven by gender differences in the unadjusted wage gap. Further,
unlike survey reports of discrimination, all three estimates of “objective”
discrimination against women are lower among young workers, though
the patterns are stronger and more consistent for wages than unemployment spells. (There is also an exception for the youngest age category
when wage discrimination is calculated using D̂ 1i .) Although we explore
these issues further in the multivariate analysis below, we draw two main
conclusions from these patterns. First, given these raw correlations, patterns of measured discrimination are not likely to be able to explain
patterns of reported gender-induced harm across age groups. Second, the
much weaker age pattern in unemployment than wage gaps suggests the
following interpretation of our evidence: compared to men of their own
age, young women face a more favorable wage distribution than older
women and take advantage of this by raising their reservation wages in
searching for both their preseparation and postseparation jobs. This is
further justification for our treatment in this article of both postseparation and preseparation wage levels as outcomes of the general level of
demand, supply, and discrimination conditions in labor markets for
workers in a given age group.
To get a more formal idea of the ability of measured discrimination to
explain the age pattern of reported discrimination, we estimate probit
models analogous to those presented in table 3 adding controls for
“observed” discrimination. Panels A and B of table 5 present the estimates
of various specifications of the probits of hurtful discrimination when
discrimination is calculated for postseparation wages using the measures
D̂ 1i and D̂ 2i , respectively. The following results are of note. As in table 3,
the age coefficient again fluctuates in significance but remains negative
and of roughly the same magnitude no matter what the specification. In
particular, the difference in the predicted probability of reporting genderinduced harm between women aged 20 and women aged 50, holding all
other characteristics fixed at their mean level, ranges from 0.177 to 0.112
in panel A and ranges from 0.248 to 0.097 in panel B. Additionally,
percent female in one’s occupation continues to be a negative and significant determinant of reports. Finally, it is worth noting the absence of a
robust relationship between measured discrimination and women’s survey reports of discrimination. The D̂ coefficients in panels A and B in
table 5 are often negative, and in all cases but one are highly insignificant,
further supporting the notion that measured discrimination is of little
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Table 5
Probit Coefficients for Gender-Induced Harm, Controlling for “Objective”
Discrimination on the Postseparation Job
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

⫺.0182
(3.12)
⫺.0031
(.02)

⫺.0202
(3.33)
.0100
(.08)

⫺.0155
(2.09)
.0397
(.32)

⫺.0144
(1.92)
⫺.0024
(.02)

no
no
no
927

yes
no
no
927

yes
yes
no
927

yes
yes
yes
908

⫺.0146
(1.92)
⫺.0086
(.07)
⫺.5808
(2.11)
yes
yes
yes
907

1

A. Controlling for D̂ :
Age
D̂ 1
Percent female in occupation
Education
Demographics
Province
Number of observations
B. Controlling for D̂ 2 :
Age
D̂

2

⫺.0116
(2.37)
⫺.1326
(.48)

⫺.0157
(2.78)
.3342
(.65)

⫺.0216
(3.00)
1.507
(2.23)

⫺.0112
(1.99)
dropped*

⫺.0106
(1.85)
dropped*

no
no
no
1,471

yes
no
no
1,471

yes
yes
no
1,471

yes
yes
yes
1,471

⫺.5660
(2.72)
yes
yes
yes
1,466

Percent female in occupation
Education
Demographics
Province
Number of observations

NOTE.—In these tables D̂ 2 was calculated for all workers— even those without postseparation jobs—
from the postseparation log wage regressions. Very similar results are obtained if the sample is restricted
to those with postseparation jobs. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
* We exclude D̂ i2 from the estimating equation because D̂ i2 is a linear combination of the other included
variables.

help in explaining patterns of reported discrimination across age groups,
or across individuals.
Table 6 assesses the robustness of the results in panels A and B in table
5 by presenting age coefficients from probits analogous to those in table
5, but when “objective” discrimination is measured, alternatively, using
preseparation wages and unemployment durations.16 As can be seen, the
age coefficients found in table 6 display the same general patterns as those
found in panels A and B in table 5, although the patterns are weaker for
unemployment spells. Further, percent female in occupation once again
remains a negative and significant influence on reports. (There is an
exception when unemployment duration discrimination is calculated using D̂ 2i .) Thus, the results found in panels A and B in table 5 seem to be
robust.17
16
Similar results are also found when discrimination in reported reservation
wages, wage changes, or employment rates are used in these regressions.
17 The one exception noted above likely results from collinearity between
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Table 6
Probit Coefficients of Gender-Induced Harm on Age, Controlling for
Discrimination in Other Dimensions
Preseparation Wage
Observed Characteristics
Controlled for:
D̂ only
Education
Education, demographics
Education, demographics,
province
Education, demographics,
province, percent
female in occupation
“Femocc” coefficient in
above

1

2

Unemployment Spell

D̂
(1)

D̂
(2)

D̂ 1
(3)

D̂ 2
(4)

⫺.0123
(2.65)
⫺.0135
(2.83)
⫺.0122
(2.05)

⫺.0104
(2.13)
⫺.0118
(2.26)
⫺.0182
(2.44)

⫺.0317
(2.60)
⫺.0366
(2.85)
⫺.0287
(1.86)

⫺.0136
(1.70)
⫺.0138
(1.69)
⫺.0113
(1.05)

⫺.0116
(1.93)

⫺.0112
(1.99)

⫺.0373
(2.25)

⫺.0145
(1.34)

⫺.0107
(1.77)

⫺.0106
(1.85)

⫺.0421
(2.38)

⫺.0143
(1.31)

⫺.7286
(3.33)

⫺.5660
(2.72)

⫺1.453
(2.24)

⫺.5863
(1.48)

NOTE.—Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.

One final, potential concern with our result in this section is “omitted experience bias.” In particular, because our measures of labor
market experience are limited to age, education, and tenure on the
preseparation job, unobserved differences in labor market experience
between men and women are likely to exist. More importantly, they
are likely to be greater among older than younger individuals, suggesting that our estimates of measured discrimination may be biased
upward for older women.
While “omitted experience bias” may be an important issue in the
precise quantification of gender-wage-gap measures, it can explain the
higher levels of reported gender-induced harm among young women in
our sample only if it is severe enough to reverse the observed positive
correlation between measured discrimination and age. We feel this is
highly unlikely for the following reasons: first, because labor market
experience cannot differ greatly among young workers, measured discrimination among the youngest cohort in our sample is unlikely to be
affected by omitted experience bias. This is the smallest amount of
discrimination for any age group in our sample (see table 4), and “true”

personal characteristics and measured discrimination, which becomes substantial
when the list of covariates comes close to exhausting the list of X variables used
to calculate the D̂ measures.

716

Antecol/Kuhn

discrimination faced by older women would have to be lower than this
measure if omitted experience bias explains our results. Second, when we
include a measure of “partial” labor market experience as an additional
underlying determinant of measured discrimination, the magnitude and
significance levels of the age coefficients presented in tables 5 and 6 are
virtually unchanged.18
Third, unlike our data, the 1985 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) does collect information on total labor market experience. When
we analyzed age patterns of measured wage discrimination in this data set,
we found that controlling for actual labor market experience does not
reverse the positive correlation between measured discrimination and age.
In particular, the PSID asked the following questions of household
“heads” and their “wives”: “How many years altogether have you
worked for money since you were 18?” and “How many of these years
did you work full-time for most or all of the year?” Using this information we are able to construct a measure of full-time experience, part-time
experience, and time out of the labor force.19 We then reestimate the log
wage regressions given by equations (1) and (2), where the following
variables are included in the X ij ’s: years of education, full-time experience, full-time experience squared, part-time experience, part-time experience squared, years out of the labor force, marital status, number of
children, racial dummy variables, and state dummy variables.20 As before,
we use the estimated coefficients from equations (1) and (2) to compute
two alternative individual-specific measures of discrimination against
women given by equation (3) and (4).
In appendix table A1, we present unadjusted means of log wages, and
of individual-specific discrimination measures based on log wages, for
women in different age categories using the 1985 PSID data. As in table
18
The COEP does contain information on whether a respondent had income
from wages in any of the 5 years preceding the survey. Using this information, we
constructed a “partial” measure of actual labor market experience equal to the
number of years in the past 5 in which they had income from wages. All “partial”
labor market experience results are available from the authors upon request.
19
Full-time experience is equal to the number of years the respondent reported
working full-time since the age 18. Part-time experience is equal to the total
number of years the respondent reported working since the age 18 minus the
number of years of full-time experience. Finally, time out of the labor force is
equal to the number of years the individual was out of the labor force since they
graduated from school.
20
Interestingly, we find that time out of the labor force has a negative and
significant effect on the wages of women, but not of men. Further, men receive a
higher return to each additional year of both full-time and part-time experience
than women. In fact, women do not receive a wage premium for part-time work
experience. All the remaining coefficients have the expected sign and are available
from the authors upon request.
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4, there is a similarity of the patterns in the unadjusted versus the
regression-adjusted wage gaps. Further, measured discrimination is lower
among younger workers than among older workers despite the inclusion
of actual labor market experience as an additional determinant of measured discrimination.
The final and most important reason why omitted experience bias
cannot explain our results is the evidence we present in the next section,
that like gender-induced harm, survey reports of gender-induced advantage are also more common among young women. This is very hard to
explain with a story based only on higher unmeasured discrimination
faced by young women; clearly a more complex explanation than omitted
experience alone is required.
We conclude the following from the analysis in this section. First,
observable characteristics of the women in our sample are unable to
account for the observed effect of age on reported discrimination. Second,
neither can any standard measure of “objective” discrimination explain
the more frequent reports of hurtful discrimination made by younger
women in our sample.
IV. Broadening the Analysis: Gender-Induced Advantage and
Men’s Perceptions
In this section we broaden our analysis by examining women’s reports
of gender-induced advantage in the labor market, as well as men’s reports
of gender-induced advantage and harm. The main goal is to ask whether
this additional information can shed any more light on young women’s
much greater propensity to report gender-induced harm. We begin our
analysis in table 7, which presents means of these additional indicators by
age. These means reveal what were to us some very surprising patterns:
first, like women, young men are also more likely to feel that they have
been hurt by gender discrimination than older men, though the relationship is certainly not as strong as it is for women.21 Further, young
women, while more likely to report gender-induced harm, are also more
likely than other women to report that they benefited from being female.22 Thus, especially for women, reports of both harm and advantage

21
Interestingly, men’s reporting patterns across education groups are however
much stronger than women’s, but of a similar nature to women’s reporting
patterns across age groups: highly educated men are much more likely to say they
were hurt by discrimination, and more likely to say they were helped by discrimination, than less-educated men. We view this as a useful topic for further
research.
22
We estimated a probit model of gender-induced advantage on age only for
women. We then add observed covariates to see if, under any specification, the
direct effect of age is substantially reduced in magnitude. Similar to our results on
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Table 7
Frequency of Other Aspects of Reported Discrimination, by Age Group
Women

Men

Age

Help
(1)

Hurt ⫹ Help
(2)

Hurt
(3)

Help
(4)

Hurt ⫹ Help
(5)

55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍25

.011
.034
.027
.051
.064

.053
.122
.120
.174
.195

.045
.042
.058
.061
.067

.038
.030
.063
.050
.058

.083
.071
.122
.111
.125

seem to move in tandem across age categories. This is illustrated in
columns 2 and 5 of table 7, which simply add together all those individuals who reported either harm or advantage. In all cases, these fractions
fall with age, generally more strongly than reports of harm or advantage
alone. Estimating a probit model of reports of either harm or advantage
on age (plus all additional control variables found in col. 5 of table 3),
separately for men and women, indicates that younger individuals are
more likely to depart from gender neutrality than older individuals,
however, this relationship is only significant for women (See appendix
table B1).23
In order to interpret these patterns, in this section we develop a
framework of the decision to report both gender-induced harm and
advantage in a confidential survey. An interesting challenge for this
framework arises from the fact that, while our dependent variable is
clearly ordered (one’s gender either hurt, had no impact, or helped), a
worker’s age appears (at least in our raw data) to have the effect of
increasing the frequency of both “extreme” outcomes (“hurt” and
“helped”). As most existing techniques for dealing with ordered data
cannot fit such patterns well, we develop some simple models that are
better suited to this purpose.

gender-induced harm, we find that, although the age coefficient does tend to
decline in significance as controls are added, it remains negative and of roughly the
same magnitude no matter what the specification.
23
Although the age coefficient in the probit for reports of either harm or
advantage on age is negative and significant for males, once controls for education
are added, the significant, negative relationship ceases to exist. This is not surprising given n. 21 above, i.e., men’s reporting patterns across education groups
are much stronger than women’s.
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A. Conceptual Framework
Assume that the net amount of favorable treatment, relative to the
opposite sex, faced by individual i in his or her job search is given by a
scalar, ⌬ i ,

冘 Z ⫹;
J

⌬i ⫽

j

ij

(5)

i

j⫽0

where  i is a normal error term with mean zero and variance 2. What we
have in mind as entering into ⌬ i includes longer or shorter unemployment
spells relative to the opposite sex, differential treatment in job interviews,
outright sexual harassment, and any other labor market outcome differentials encountered by the individual (whether observed or unobserved
by the econometrician) relative to a similar person of the opposite sex. To
allow for reports of both gender-induced harm and advantage, suppose
that a woman reports that her job search was unaffected by her gender if
and only if
⫺K ⬍ ⌬ i ⬍ K,

(6)

where K is the threshold amount of differential treatment that induces
reports of either harm (in the lower tail of the distribution of ⌬ i ) or
advantage (in the upper tail).24
Combining (5) and (6), an individual reports neither harm or advantage
if and only if

冉

冘
J

⫺K ⫺

j⫽0

冊

冉

冊

冉

Z ij /  ⬍  i ⬍ K ⫺

冘 Z

冊

J

ij

j⫽0

/ 

(7)

/ ,

(8)

or

冉

冘
J

K1 ⫺

j⫽1

 jZ ij /  ⬍  i ⬍ K 2 ⫺

冘 Z
J

j

j⫽1

冊

ij

24
For now, we assume a constant reporting threshold across individuals; in
what follows we shall explicitly model the dependence of this threshold on age.
Note also that, because ⌬ i has an intercept (see eq. [8]), (6) does not constrain
reports of harm and advantage to be equally frequent; instead the symmetry of (6)
is meant to capture the notion of individuals implicitly conducting two-tailed
hypothesis tests about whether discrimination exists, which by construction are
symmetric.
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where  i is a standard normal variate. In (8), K 1 ⫽  0 ⫺ K, and K 2 ⫽  0
⫹ K. Reports of hurtful and helpful discrimination are given by the
obvious complementary expressions.
The model in (8), as written, is a standard ordered probit equation with
three ordered responses. As is well known, , which in our model
represents the standard deviation of individuals’ experiences that is not
associated with observed characteristics, is not identified; the standard
practice is to normalize it to one and interpret the coefficient estimates as
relative to this term, that is, as estimates of /. Note that this model also
generates estimates of standardized “cutoffs,” K 1 /  and K 2 /  .
B. Two Hypotheses, Three Models
We now use (8) as a framework for testing two broad hypotheses that
might explain the greater propensity of both young men and women to
report helpful and hurtful discrimination. The first of these is greater
heterogeneity in the gender-related treatment experienced by the young:
large amounts of both hurtful and helpful discrimination may be more
common among the young, for example, if the young find themselves in
a much greater variety of jobs and work situations than their parents.
There are two main ways that this idea of “greater heterogeneity”
might enter the model in (8). One is that young women could be endowed
with a distribution of observed characteristics (Z’s) that generates more
reports in both tails; to assess whether this kind of heterogeneity can
explain the pattern of reports in our data, we simply estimate (8) as it
stands, then ask whether (given the actual distribution of observed characteristics in our data) it can successfully mimic the pattern of reports
across age groups in the data. In what follows, we shall refer to this
ordinary ordered probit as “model 1.”
Maximum likelihood coefficient estimates for model 1 are shown in
column 1 of table 8 for women and column 1 of table 9 for men.25 They
show the following. First, as in the previous section, only a few observed
characteristics (Z’s) have significant direct effects (’s) on the total
amount of net favorable treatment faced by individual women or men.
These include the percent female in one’s occupation, marital status, and
education; they do not include age. As expected, high values of percent
female in one’s occupation significantly increase (decrease) the probability of reporting helpful (hurtful) discrimination for women. Although not
significant, the reverse is true for men: thus both women and men are

25
A key method of assessing our models’ performance in this section involves
comparing the predicted pattern of reports across age groups with the unadjusted
means in tables 2 and 7. For that reason we represent age by a set of four dummy
variables, instead of a continuous variable, throughout this section.
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Table 8
Ordered Probit Models of Gender-Induced Harm and Advantage: Women
Model 1
Age 25–34
Age 35–44
Age 45–54
Age 55–64
Education:
High school
Some college or university
College degree
University degree
Married
Separated/divorced/widowed
Children less than 6 years old
Tenure (ROE job)
Percent female in occupation
c1
c2
d2
d3
d4
d5
b2
b3
b4
b5
Log likelihood

⫺.0982
⫺.0945
⫺.0360
.0010

Model 2
(.82)
(.97)
(.38)
(.41)

⫺.1236 (.99)
⫺.1859 (1.38)
⫺.1009 (.67)
⫺.1983 (.74)

⫺.0789 (.76)
.0821 (.62)
.1377 (1.09)
⫺.0842 (.65)
.1970 (1.99)
.0463 (.33)
.0118 (.16)
⫺.0000 (.14)
.4385 (2.57)
⫺1.10
(6.87)
1.99 (11.72)

⫺.0832 (.92)
.0557 (.48)
.1169 (1.05)
⫺.1149 (1.02)
.1725 (1.97)
.0083 (.07)
.0215 (.33)
⫺.0000 (.28)
.4087 (2.73)
⫺.9704 (6.32)
1.71 (9.22)

⫺705.71

⫺.0649 (.87)
⫺.2013 (3.17)
⫺.1747 (2.48)
⫺.3219 (3.61)
⫺697.44

⫺.0833 (.79)
.0777 (.58)
.1349 (1.05)
⫺.0992 (.76)
.1934 (1.97)
.0206 (.15)
.0141 (.19)
⫺.0000 (.16)
.4612 (2.66)
⫺.9680 (5.70)
1.75 (9.09)
⫺.0849 (.79)
⫺.2988 (2.66)
⫺.2428 (2.02)
⫺.6352 (2.66)

(.78)
(.72)
(.24)
(.01)

⫺.0956
⫺.1162
⫺.0508
⫺.0780

Model 3

⫺698.13

NOTE.—1,466 observations in all three models. Province dummies were included in all three models.
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. ROE ⫽ Record of Employment.

more likely to feel harmed when they find themselves in a “minority” in
their occupation. Further, marital status also has opposite effects on the
underlying “net favorable treatment” index, ⌬, for men and women, with
the effect being significant for women. Compared to less than high
school—the omitted category—men’s probability of reporting hurtful
(helpful) discrimination is significantly higher (lower) at the two highest
levels of education (college and university). The same is not true for
women.
Can model 1 successfully explain the pattern of reported genderinduced harm and advantage in our data? To address this issue, the
predicted pattern of reported discrimination from the model across age
groups is shown in part B of table 10. These predictions give the mean
predicted fraction of individuals in each age category reporting discrimination, with each age category evaluated at its own mean characteristics,
Z. Thus they are directly comparable with the sample means for these
variables in tables 2 and 7, reproduced for convenience in part A of table
10. Clearly, model 1 cannot successfully mimic the pattern of lower
reports of both harm and advantage among younger women in our data.
A second way in which greater heterogeneity for the young could enter
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Table 9
Ordered Probit Models of Gender-Induced Harm and Advantage: Men
Model 1
Age 25–34
Age 35–44
Age 45–54
Age 55–64
Education:
High school
Some college or university
College degree
University degree
Married
Separated/divorced/widowed
Children less than 6 years old
Tenure (ROE job)
Percent female in occupation
c1
c2
d2
d3
d4
d5
b2
b3
b4
b5
Log likelihood

.0636
.0940
⫺.0172
.0389

Model 2

(.56)
(.75)
(.12)
(.22)

.0575
.0819
⫺.0322
.0320

(.53)
(.68)
(.24)
(.19)

⫺.1799 (2.04)
⫺.1286 (1.13)
⫺.2341 (1.96)
⫺.2741 (2.12)
⫺.0320 (.34)
⫺.1038 (.71)
.0000 (.00)
⫺.0001 (.60)
⫺.2672 (1.69)
⫺1.76 (13.14)
1.57 (11.89)

⫺.1815 (2.13)
⫺.1367 (1.25)
⫺.2254 (1.96)
⫺.2940 (2.35)
⫺.0215 (.24)
⫺.1081 (.77)
⫺.0042 (.07)
⫺.0001 (.70)
⫺.2617 (1.73)
⫺1.70 (11.51)
1.47 (10.04)

⫺805.14

⫺.0358 (.61)
⫺.0051 (.08)
⫺.1578 (2.65)
⫺.1173 (1.43)
⫺800.45

Model 3
.0588
.0852
⫺.0420
.0349

(.53)
(.70)
(.29)
(.19)

⫺.1875 (2.11)
⫺.1375 (1.21)
⫺.2353 (1.97)
⫺.2908 (2.23)
⫺.0283 (.30)
⫺.1078 (.72)
⫺.0016 (.03)
⫺.0001 (.65)
⫺.2702 (1.70)
⫺1.70 (11.51)
1.48
(9.76)
⫺.0515 (.54)
⫺.0117 (.12)
⫺.2860 (2.39)
⫺.1862 (1.21)

⫺800.68

NOTE.—2,057 observations in all three models. Province dummies were included in all three models.
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. ROE ⫽ Record of Employment.

our model is through unobserved factors rather than observed ones, that
is, through a higher level of . To explore this possibility, let “model 2”
be a variation of (8) in which:

冘bA,
5

 ⫽ 0 ⫹

k

k

(9)

2

where the A k are dummies for each of the age groups in the sample. It is
then easy to see how age, working through the , can increase reports in
both tails of the distribution. Again, while the relative variance terms for
different age groups, that is, the b k , are identified, the overall “baseline”
variance is not; we thus set 0 equal to one and interpret the b k accordingly. To the extent the estimated variance of unobserved differential
treatment declines with age, and that this model successfully mimics the
pattern of reported discrimination across age groups in the raw data, we
can conclude that a possible cause of the greater reports of hurtful
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Table 10
Predictions of Gender-Induced Harm and Advantage by
Age Category: Alternative Models
Age Category Hurt No Impact Help
A. Sample means:
Females

Males

B. Model 1: Fixed cutoffs
and variance:
Females

Males

C. Model 2: Variance varies
with age:
Females

Males

D. Model 3: Cutoffs vary
symmetrically with age:
Females

Males

55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍ 25
55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍ 25

.043
.088
.093
.123
.132
.045
.042
.058
.061
.067

.947
.878
.880
.826
.805
.917
.929
.878
.889
.875

.011
.034
.027
.051
.064
.038
.030
.063
.050
.058

55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍ 25
55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍ 25

.085
.095
.106
.108
.112
.051
.056
.047
.050
.055

.867
.862
.855
.854
.852
.897
.899
.899
.899
.900

.047
.043
.039
.038
.035
.052
.045
.055
.050
.046

55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍ 25
55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍ 25

.051
.087
.093
.122
.140
.039
.038
.054
.053
.063

.935
.878
.880
.826
.799
.921
.935
.884
.895
.883

.014
.036
.027
.051
.061
.041
.028
.062
.052
.054

55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍ 25
55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
⬍ 25

.048
.089
.094
.121
.138
.040
.038
.054
.053
.063

.940
.874
.878
.829
.803
.918
.935
.885
.894
.883

.012
.037
.028
.050
.059
.042
.027
.062
.053
.054

discrimination among young women is greater unobserved heterogeneity
in the labor market experiences of such women.
Coefficient estimates for model 2 are shown in column 2 of tables 8 and
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9; for the most part, all the observed covariates (Z) have coefficients of
similar size and significance compared to column 1 of tables 8 and 9.
Concerning the variance parameters (b), we find that the estimated
variance of unobserved evidence decreases as we move “up” the age
categories, beginning with the omitted category (age 15–24). The standard
deviation is significantly higher among the youngest age group, compared
to the oldest. Further, as table 10 shows, model 2 is also much better at
mimicking the patterns of reported discrimination across age groups for
both men and women in our data. Overall, we take our estimates of
models 1 and 2 together as mixed support for the “heterogeneity” hypothesis, because if the experiences of the young really are more heterogeneous, we would expect at least some of this to be captured by their
observed characteristics in model 1. Given this mixed message, we now
turn to a final hypothesis.
The final hypothesis we consider in this article involves not a difference in
the “actual” labor market experiences of the young and old but a difference
in how their experiences are translated into survey reports of harm or
advantage. In particular, we now ask what happens when we hold 
constant, but let the amount of departure from gender neutrality, K, which
induces reports of hurtful or helpful discrimination, vary across age groups.
Noting from (7) and (8) that an increase in K has the effect of reducing K1 and
increasing K2 by equal amounts, this is equivalent to specifying

冘dA
5

K1 ⫽ K1 ⫹

k

k

(10)

2

and

冘dA.
5

K2 ⫽ K2 ⫺

k

k

(11)

2

The idea is, in a sense, that younger women (and perhaps younger men)
are less “tolerant” of (or more sensitive to) departures from gender
neutrality, in the sense that these are more likely to induce reports of
harm or advantage, than older people. It is worth noting that this notion
is, at least in principle, empirically distinguishable from the previous
version of the model where unobserved heterogeneity, , varied across
age groups;26 thus we estimate model 3 as well, and ask how well it can
mimic actual patterns of reported discrimination in the data.
26
To see that these “unobserved heterogeneity” and “differences in thresholds”
models have different empirical implications, consider the effect of  and K 1 on
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Coefficient estimates from model 3 are shown in column 3 of tables 8
and 9. As we might expect, the estimated cutoffs for reporting harm or
advantage move farther apart as we move up the age ladder.27 And, as part
D of table 10 shows, model 3—like model 2— does a successful job of
reproducing the pattern of increasing reports in both tails found among
young women and men in the raw data. Indeed, while there are some
subtle conceptual differences between models 2 and 3, both yield essentially the same maximized value of the log-likelihood function, and
(because they have the same number of parameters as well) are essentially
indistinguishable statistically. On the other hand, testing model 1, which
has four fewer parameters, against model 3 yields a likelihood ratio (LR)
test statistic for women of 15.15 with a p-value of 0.004; for men of 8.93
with a p-value of 0.063. Similar test results are obtained when model 2 is
used as the unrestricted model; thus both models are preferred to the
simple ordered probit specification of model 1.
Conceptually, both greater heterogeneity in the experiences of young
people and less “tolerance” of departures from gender neutrality among
the young could of course explain the greater tendency of young men and
young women to report both hurtful and helpful discrimination in our
data. In this section, however, we have shown two things. First, if it is
differences in the amount of heterogeneity that matters, it must be
heterogeneity that is not captured by any of the independent variables in
our data set, that is, what we call heterogeneity on unobserved dimensions. Second, a model that allows for differentials in either the variance
of unobserved heterogeneity or in reporting thresholds across age groups
is statistically preferred for both women and men to one that does not.
V. Conclusions
Virtually all the standard, “objective” measures of discrimination computed by economists, including unadjusted or residual wage gaps, and
unadjusted or residual gaps in unemployment durations, tend to be higher
among older than younger women. Whether this represents true age
effects or a difference across cohorts remains an open question, but it is
clear that, among women in the labor market today, discrimination as we
usually measure it is much more prevalent among older women. At the
same time, and perhaps paradoxically, younger women are much more

the left-hand side of (8), which determines the fraction of individuals reporting
hurtful discrimination. An age-related change in  changes the sensitivity of the
left-hand side to the observed covariates, Z. An age-related change in K 1 does not.
27
A negative d 2 , e.g., reduces the lower threshold (thus reducing reports of
hurtful discrimination) while at the same time increasing the upper threshold and
reducing reports of “helpful” discrimination.

726

Antecol/Kuhn

likely than older women to report, in confidential surveys, that they have
suffered from sex discrimination or experienced gender-induced harm in
the labor market. This lack of correspondence between the two measures,
in our view, should raise serious questions about whether “objective”
measures really capture what most women really see as discriminatory
treatment in labor markets today.
This article has attempted to resolve the apparent inconsistency between age patterns of reported and measured discrimination using a new
data set on Canadian job seekers. Significant advantages of this data
include a richer set of “objective” labor market outcome variables, including unemployment durations, reservation wages, and wage changes,
in addition to the wage levels that are usually examined, and a richer set
of perceived discrimination measures than in previous studies. In contrast
to earlier work, we have information not only on women’s perceptions of
gender-induced harm but also on women’s perceptions of gender-induced
advantage, and on men’s perceptions of advantage and harm.
Our main findings are as follows. First, young women’s more frequent
reports of gender-induced harm cannot be statistically attributed to any
observable differences between them and older women, including the
presence of children and degree of occupational segregation. Interestingly, we do find that minority status in an occupation increases reports
of gender-induced harm among both women and men. However, as
minority status is not correlated with age in our data, this does not help
explain the age pattern of reports.
Second, as expected, young women’s more frequent reports of harm
also cannot be attributed to a higher level of “objectively” measured
discrimination on any of a large set of dimensions we can measure,
including wages and unemployment. Third, the newly available information on perceptions of discrimination in our survey allows us to rule out
another potential explanation of young women’s greater reported harm: a
higher mean level of unmeasured discrimination against young women.
This is because of a surprising and robust symmetry in the correlation of
age with reports of discrimination in our data: reports of both hurtful and
“helpful” discrimination fall with age in our data, and do so for both
women and men.
Fourth, we identify two hypotheses that are potentially consistent with
all the patterns we observe. One of these— greater dispersion in the labor
market experiences of young workers—receives mixed support, in the
sense that it is consistent with our data only if none of these differences
in dispersion can be captured by dispersion in the observed covariates in
our data. Alternatively, our results could be explained by a very particular
kind of age difference in reporting behavior: young workers of both sexes
may simply be more willing than older workers to interpret departures in
either direction from gender-neutral treatment as causally related to their
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gender. Interestingly, this difference in reporting behavior takes exactly
the form we would expect if, in conducting implicit statistical “tests”
about whether they face discrimination based on the information available, younger persons used a less stringent significance criterion.
In future work, other demographic patterns in reported discrimination
may of course also be identified and analyzed.28 At the same time,
additional explanations of age and other demographic patterns in reports
are likely to emerge. What seems clear from the current analysis, however,
is that all such hypotheses will need to somehow be consistent with the
surprising symmetry in responses of helpful and hurtful discrimination to
age that emerges so strongly from our data here. This stronger perceived
effect—in both directions— of gender on young peoples’ labor market
outcomes must somehow figure into those new stories.
Finally, it may be worth noting that even if we adopt the pure “reporting differences” interpretation of our results, those results may still
have important policy implications. For example, if lower “tolerance” of
nongender-neutral treatment remains a permanent attribute of today’s
cohort of young workers, designers of future antidiscrimination policies
face a dilemma: while the young are less tolerant of discrimination, they
also appear to be less tolerant of reverse discrimination. Creating policies
that address the former problem without creating perceptions of the latter
may thus become increasingly difficult in coming decades.

Appendix A
Table A1
“Objective” Wage Discrimination, by Age Group: Estimates from the 1985
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Measured Discrimination: Log Wages
Age
55–64
45–54
35–44
25–34
18–24

Unadjusted Gap
(1)

Adjusted Gap (D̂1)
(2)

Adjusted Gap (D̂2)
(3)

.519
.594
.465
.326
.219

.465
.455
.340
.233
.258

.499
.420
.334
.258
.202

28
A prime candidate here is education effects. As noted earlier, education
effects are stronger for men than women but exhibit the same “symmetry”
property as was identified here for age. Patterns of reported discrimination against
various ethnic and racial groups also deserve analysis.
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Appendix B
Table B1
Probit Coefficients for Gender-Induced Harm or Advantage
Women
Age
Education:
High school
Some college or university
College degree
University degree
Married
Separated/divorced/widowed
Children less than 6 years old
Tenure (ROE job)
Percent female in occupation

Men

⫺.0116

(2.25)

⫺.0007

(.16)

⫺.0673
⫺.0703
.0929
.2679
⫺.1718
.1733
⫺.0444
⫺.0000
⫺.3631

(.57)
(.47)
(.67)
(1.93)
(1.61)
(1.15)
(.54)
(.26)
(1.90)

.0025
.3122
.1848
.1890
⫺.0995
⫺.1019
.0355
⫺.0001
.2025

(.02)
(2.55)
(1.42)
(1.35)
(.96)
(.62)
(.53)
(.80)
(1.17)

NOTE.—Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. ROE ⫽ Record of Employment. In addition to
the control variables above, the probit regressions include provincial dummy variables.
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